Ratings11
Average rating3.5
D-Dag var ikke kun et resultat af synlige militære operationer, men også i høj grad af efterretningsvæsen og dobbeltagenter
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I found this a thoroughly engrossing read about the very strange world of a group of double agents who helped win WWII.
Reads more like a novel than history. Very good complement to Masterman's book “The Double Cross System”. It's also interesting to read some of the techniques used in the deceptions which show up in John le Carre's novels.
The story of D-Day has been told from the many points of view. From the soldiers who fought in it, the tacticians who planned it and the generals who led it. In Double Cross its from the perspective of a strange handful of spies who made it possible. Thorough their espionage, deceit, and twisted thinking.
The Double-Cross System or XX System, was a World War II counter-espionage and deception operation of the British Security Service. A civilian organisation usually referred to by its cover title MI5. Nazi agents in Britain, both real and false, were captured, turned themselves in or simply announced themselves. They were then used by the British to broadcast disinformation to their Nazi controllers. Its operations were overseen by the Twenty Committee under the chairmanship of John Cecil Masterman. The name of the committee comes from the number 20 in Roman numerals: “XX” (i.e. a double cross).
The policy of MI5 during the war was initially to use the system for counter-espionage. It was only later that its potential for deception purposes was realised. Agents from the German intelligence services, Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), were apprehended. Many of the agents who reached British shores turned themselves in to the authorities. Still others were apprehended when they made elementary mistakes during their operations. Also, some were false agents who had tricked the Germans into believing they would spy for them if they helped them reach England (e.g., Treasure, Fido). Later agents were instructed to contact agents who, unknown to the Abwehr, were controlled by the British. The Abwehr and SD sent agents over by parachute drop, submarine and travel via neutral countries. The last route was most commonly used, with agents often impersonating refugees. After the war it was discovered that all the agents Germany sent to Britain had given themselves up or had been captured, with the possible exception of one who committed suicide.
A decent enough stab at a familiar period of history. But not one of Macintyre's better efforts.