Roosevelt and Morgenthau

This further pruning and revision has been executed in the interest of the general reader, to provide a shorter edition centered more specifically upon the friendship and collaboration between Morgenthau and FDR, through the Depression, the New Deal, and the Second World War. Blum does venture some (largely positive) assessment of Morgenthau's career in his introduction and some generally accepted criticism (of Morgenthau's reluctance to embrace a Keynesian fiscal policy, of his Plan for Germany) in the body of the work. But essentially the emphases, insights, and conclusions are Morgenthau's, and the book closes with his reflections in 1966 about his years in government and what they had meant to him (he died in 1967). For a popular historical work, this is still a fairly dense accounting, with the political far outweighing the personal content. Reasonably accessible, nonetheless, and clearly a major secondary/primary source on the two men and the history they helped shape. - Kirkus Review.

Roosevelt and Morgenthau: A Revision and Condensation of From the Morgenthau Diaries condenses and unites in one volume the three volumes offered by Blum between 1957 and 1967. When originally published, they were deservedly heralded for the instructive glimpse they gave of the inside workings of the Roosevelt administration. They seem to have lost none of their luster in abbreviation. The first two volumes deal primarily with fiscal policy. Morgenthau fretted continually about deficit financing and big spending. Paradoxically, he was a conservative on fiscal policy and opposed the very counter-cyclical measures which were at the heart of the New Deal recovery program. But in the end, the heart usually won out over the head and he went along with Roosevelt. By 1938 the story begins to broaden. Morganthau was becoming involved in the foreign policy area, especially where impinged on fiscal policy. In perspective, most of the positions he took stand up rather well. He was among the first to realize the danger posed by the ominous turn of events in Germany and his counsel to the president was rarely tinged with the virus of appeasement so popular among certain State Department and diplomatic personnel. He was an enthusiastic advocate of a complete embargo of all strategic materials to Japan after her suspicious activity in Indochina came to light. He played an important role in the destroyer bases deal and a crucial one in formulating Lend-Lease policy. - Henry L. Feingold, American Jewish Historical Quarterly, v. 60, no. 2 (December 1970), p. 206.